Causation and incentives in updating courts

Research output: Contribution to journalComment/Debate

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)152-155
Number of pages4
JournalJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
Volume176
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2020

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
I begin with a simple model. There are two parties, an injurer and a victim. The injurer makes a decision under uncertainty, which is represented through a set of two states of the world, where the true state has not realized or is otherwise not known by the actor at time the decision is made. Let s1 and s2 be the two states of * Faculty of Law, Western University, London (ON), Canada; Faculty of Law and Department of Economics, University of Haifa, Israel. The author thanks Andrew Bot-terell, Christopher Chambers, Maytal Gilboa, Ronen Perry, and Stephen Pitel for their comments. This research was undertaken, in part, thanks to funding from the Canada Research Chairs program.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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