Abstract
Studies of the Israeli public sector point to the vast influence of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) across multiple policy domains. This chapter combines bureaucratic politics research and the notion of veto players to theorize a two-tiered power game between bureaucratic and political players. It argues that the policy influence of bureaucracies is shaped by stable institutional factors and by the extent to which powerful politicians are inclined to intervene. In Israel, legal provisions vest the MOF with an institutional advantage over other bureaus and their ministers. Yet the MOF’s ability to exploit its advantaged position is contingent upon the joint propensity of the prime minister (PM) and the finance minister (FM) to forgo intervention. The chapter associates the PM’s and FM’s inclination to support the MOF with their political motivation to maintain their grip on the agenda of an increasingly fragmented coalition government. Thus, the MOF’s supremacy is reliant upon, and underpins, political power.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The Oxford Handbook of Israeli Politics and Society |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 367-382 |
Number of pages | 16 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780190675585 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jan 2018 |
Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© Oxford University Press 2021.
Keywords
- Bureaucratic politics
- Bureaucratic power
- Ministry of finance
- Political control
- Veto players
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Social Sciences