Boundedly rational entrepreneurs and antitrust

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This article examines entrepreneurial activity and its implication for policy and antitrust law from a behavioral perspective. In particular, the analysis here focuses on the role of two sets of behavioral phenomena—overconfident beliefs and risk-seeking preferences—in facilitating boundedly rational entrepreneurship. Boundedly rational entrepreneurs may engage in entrepreneurial activity, such as the starting of new business ventures, under circumstances in which rational entrepreneurs would decline to do so. Consequently, overconfident or risk-seeking entrants compete with their more rational counterparts and create a post-entry landscape that differs markedly from the picture assumed by traditional economic accounts of entrepreneurial activity. The behaviorally informed analysis of entry sheds new light on the dynamics of competition among entrepreneurs and on its implications for policy and antitrust law.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)520-540
Number of pages21
JournalAntitrust Bulletin
Issue number4
StatePublished - 1 Dec 2016

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2016.


  • Bounded rationality
  • Entry
  • Optimism
  • Overconfidence
  • Rationality
  • Risk-seeking

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Law


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