Two-player zero-sum graph games are a central model, which proceeds as follows. A token is placed on a vertex of a graph, and the two players move it to produce an infinite play, which determines the winner or payoff of the game. Traditionally, the players alternate turns in moving the token. In bidding games, however, the players have budgets and in each turn, an auction (bidding) determines which player moves the token. So far, bidding games have only been studied as full-information games. In this work we initiate the study of partial-information bidding games: we study bidding games in which a player's initial budget is drawn from a known probability distribution. We show that while for some bidding mechanisms and objectives, it is straightforward to adapt the results from the full-information setting to the partial-information setting, for others, the analysis is significantly more challenging, requires new techniques, and gives rise to interesting results. Specifically, we study games with mean-payoff objectives in combination with poorman bidding. We construct optimal strategies for a partially-informed player who plays against a fully-informed adversary. We show that, somewhat surprisingly, the value under pure strategies does not necessarily exist in such games.
|Title of host publication||AAAI-23 Technical Tracks 5|
|Editors||Brian Williams, Yiling Chen, Jennifer Neville|
|Number of pages||8|
|State||Published - 27 Jun 2023|
|Event||37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2023 - Washington, United States|
Duration: 7 Feb 2023 → 14 Feb 2023
|Name||Proceedings of the 37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2023|
|Conference||37th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2023|
|Period||7/02/23 → 14/02/23|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
This research was supported in part by ISF grant no. 1679/21, by the ERC CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt), and the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement No. 665385.
Copyright © 2023, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Artificial Intelligence