Belief-like imaginings and perceptual (non-)assertoricity

Alon Chasid, Assaf Weksler

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


The goal of this paper is to show that certain perceptual experiences are non-assertoric due to penetration by attitudinal, belief-like imaginings. After surveying common interpretations of perceptual assertoricity and implications of these readings, we adduce cases of non-assertoric perceptual experience. We argue that in such cases, perceptual experience is non-assertoric due to penetration by belief-like imaginings. We then explain that because imaginings are, in a crucial sense, not directed at the real world, the experiences they penetrate are rendered non-assertoric.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)731-751
Number of pages21
JournalPhilosophical Psychology
Issue number5
StatePublished - 3 Jul 2020

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This work was supported by the Israel Science Foundation [939/16].

Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, © 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.


  • Perceptual assertoricity
  • belief-like imagining
  • cognitive penetration

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Applied Psychology
  • Philosophy


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