The goal of this paper is to show that certain perceptual experiences are non-assertoric due to penetration by attitudinal, belief-like imaginings. After surveying common interpretations of perceptual assertoricity and implications of these readings, we adduce cases of non-assertoric perceptual experience. We argue that in such cases, perceptual experience is non-assertoric due to penetration by belief-like imaginings. We then explain that because imaginings are, in a crucial sense, not directed at the real world, the experiences they penetrate are rendered non-assertoric.
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
This work was supported by the Israel Science Foundation [939/16].
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- Perceptual assertoricity
- belief-like imagining
- cognitive penetration
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Applied Psychology