Bayesian equilibrium in a public good economy

Shlomit Hon-Snir, Benyamin Shitovitz, Menahem Spiegel

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper studies the provision of a public good via voluntary contributions in an economy with uncertainty and differential information. Consumers differ in their private information regarding their future endowment as well as in their preferences. Each consumer selects her consumption ex ante, i.e., before knowing the state of nature. Contributions to the provision of the public good are determined ex post, i.e., when the state of nature is realized. Assuming that some normality conditions hold, a Bayesian equilibrium exists. Further, equilibrium is unique, regardless of the number of consumers, when either (1) the information partitions of consumers can be ranked from the finest to the coarsest, or (2) there are only two types of consumers.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)387-398
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Issue number2
StatePublished - Apr 2010

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Economics and Econometrics


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