Back to the Trib Tribes’ Centrality in Iraq’s Intercommunity Rapprochement

The tribes carry considerable weight in Iraq’s domestic political life and foreign relations. They are indispensable for the country’s security and sectarian rapprochement due to their capacity for disrupting the present fledgling and brittle Sunni-Shi’i cooperation. In 2018, Shi’i tribes proved capable of splitting the Iraqi Shi’i camp and pushing Baghdad-Tehran relations into a moment of crisis. On the political level, due to intertribal rivalries and a leadership vacuum, the tribes are unable to establish coalitions for success in general elections. Yet, under a nontribal leadership and as part of larger electoral lists, they helped build Sunni-Shi’i winning parliamentary coalitions. In the May 2018 general elections, Sunni tribal leaders could be found in the two largest coalitions: the Iraq-first one, led by the junior cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and previous prime minister Haidar al-Abadi, and the pro-Iranian one led by militia leader Hadi al-Amiri and the former prime minister Nuri al-Maliki. At the same time, however, large parts of the Sunni tribes remained alienated from Baghdad and even from their own politician-shaykhs who “surrendered” to the Shi’i politicians (Middle East Monitor 2018; The New Arab 2018). 1. See, for example, the demonstration of young Halabsa tribesmen against Muhammad Rikan Hadid al-Halbusi, their own shaykh, who joined the pro-Iranian Amiri-Maliki coalition and was rewarded by becoming speaker of the parliament. They called him “traitor.” Former defense minister Khaled al-Obeidi, a shaykh of the Sunni Ubayd, was supported by the rival coalition. In the long run, only reconstruction, development, and employment will pacify the Sunni tribes and, accompanied by tough security policy, encourage the 100, 000 Shi’i tribal fighters to leave al-hashd al-sha’bi (or PMF, Popular Mobilization Force) that fought ISIS and return to civilian life.