Axiomatizations of the equal-loss and weighted equal-loss bargaining solutions

Shiran Rachmilevitch

doi:10.1007/s00355-017-1045-9

Axiomatizations of the equal-loss and weighted equal-loss bargaining solutions

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

The 2-person equal-loss bargaining solution (Chun Econ Lett 26:103–106, 1988) is characterized on the basis of the following axioms: concavity, Pareto optimality, symmetry, and restricted monotonicity. Replacing symmetry by strong individual rationality and extending the bargaining domain so that it contains a degenerate problem that consists solely of the disagreement point results in a characterization of a weighted version of the equal-loss solution.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-9
Number of pages	9
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	49
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1045-9
State	Published - 1 Jun 2017

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2017, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1007/s00355-017-1045-9

Cite this

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Axiomatizations of the equal-loss and weighted equal-loss bargaining solutions

Abstract

Bibliographical note

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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