Axiomatic bargaining theory: New wine from old bottles

Dominik Karos; Shiran Rachmilevitch

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.009

Axiomatic bargaining theory: New wine from old bottles

Dominik Karos, Shiran Rachmilevitch

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Five classical and uncontroversial axioms—symmetry, weak Pareto optimality, restricted monotonicity, midpoint domination, and superadditivity—characterize a bargaining solution. It assigns to each player their midpoint, that is, the n-th share of their utopia point, and equally divides what remains.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	112-117
Number of pages	6
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	149
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.009
State	Published - Jan 2025

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 The Author(s)

Keywords

Bargaining
Midpoint domination
Superadditivity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.009

Cite this

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abstract = "Five classical and uncontroversial axioms—symmetry, weak Pareto optimality, restricted monotonicity, midpoint domination, and superadditivity—characterize a bargaining solution. It assigns to each player their midpoint, that is, the n-th share of their utopia point, and equally divides what remains.",

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Axiomatic bargaining theory: New wine from old bottles

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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