All-pay auctions with variable rewards

Todd Kaplan, Israel Luski, Aner Sela, David Wettstein

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We study all-pay auctions with variable rewards under incomplete information. In standard models, a reward depends on a bidder's privately known type; however, in our model it is also a function of his bid. We show that in such models there is a potential for paradoxical behavior where a reduction in the rewards or an increase in costs may increase the expected sum of bids or alternatively the expected highest bid.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)417-430
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Industrial Economics
Volume50
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2002
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Business, Management and Accounting (all)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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