Addressing the risks of dual use research: who is responsible?

This article addresses the question of how the responsibilities for addressing the risks of dual use research ought to be divided. We begin by presenting the maximalist claim that proposes that since scientists are well placed to judge the potential for misuse of their studies, they alone are responsible for addressing these risks. Before assessing this position, we consider a claim that rejects the maximalist position, namely that scientists need not consider the possibility that their studies might be misused because the goods of science are so important, they should not spend time on anything but generating valuable knowledge. This claim, we argue, fails, as these goods do not always outweigh the risks of misuse. Given this conclusion we turn to assess two versions of the maximalist claim. The first suggests that when a possibility of misuse arises, scientists ought to adopt the precautionary principle (PP) to discharge their moral responsibilities. We argue that PP is problematic as it does not give much guidance on what scientists should do. An alternative to meeting scientists’ moral responsibilities is through applying a risk-benefit analysis; however, due to epistemic biases and limitations, scientists are prone to make mistakes in their analysis. We thus suggest an alternative approach, in which responsibilities are divided between scientists and agents that can conduct an analysis that is more likely to generate unbiased and comprehensive conclusions on how the risks of dual use research, should be addressed.