Accountability and corruption: Political institutions matter

Daniel Lederman, Norman V. Loayza, Rodrigo R. Soares

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This study uses a cross-country panel to examine the determinants of corruption, paying particular attention to political institutions that increase accountability. Even though the theoretical literature has stressed the importance of political institutions in determining corruption, the empirical literature is relatively scarce. Our results confirm the role of political institutions in determining the prevalence of corruption. Democracies, parliamentary systems, political stability, and freedom of press are all associated with lower corruption. Additionally, common results of the previous empirical literature, related to openness and legal tradition, do not hold once political variables are taken into account.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-35
Number of pages35
JournalEconomics and Politics
Volume17
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2005
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Accountability and corruption: Political institutions matter'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this