A theoretical analysis of U.S.-soviet conflict management in the middle east

This chapter discusses the internal reforms in the Soviet Union have paved the way for a higher level of cooperation between Washington and Moscow in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. A major distinction in the area of conflict management was developed by Alexander George between crisis management and crisis prevention. The power-politics perspective appears to go a long way toward explaining the failure of non-crisis superpower cooperation in the Middle East. The superpowers tacitly agreed that the overthrow of Middle Eastern governments through external military pressure should be avoided. The transition to bipolarity made possible the emergence of tacit norms that were not only necessary for effective coordination between adversaries during crises, but were also important for the superpowers in regulating the Middle East crises. The new Soviet leadership also seemingly realized that it would be extremely difficult for any one of the superpowers to permanently exclude the other superpower from such a turbulent and important region as the Middle East.