Abstract
Russell is commonly accused of failing to solve Bradley’s problem of unity. In this paper I argue that the problem doesn’t really pose a distinctively philosophical question; that Russell’s account of unity exposes the problem as unworthy of an
answer. I accept that this isn’t a solution, but it does constitute a substantive non-solution! Furthermore, some scholars have read in Russell’s writings a confession of guilt to the effect that he was defeated by the problem of unity: this, I argue, is a misreading of the texts in question
answer. I accept that this isn’t a solution, but it does constitute a substantive non-solution! Furthermore, some scholars have read in Russell’s writings a confession of guilt to the effect that he was defeated by the problem of unity: this, I argue, is a misreading of the texts in question
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1-27 |
| Journal | The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication |
| Volume | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2008 |
| Externally published | Yes |