A contrast of comparable programs involving fighter aircraft and unmanned aircraft vehicle (UAV) programs within the United States and Israel highlights the need for strategic agility in defense procurement. We find that increased political oversight of defense procurement tends to increase cost and time required to field capability, creating a need to balance the benefits and cost of oversight. The comparison of acquisition programs offers additional policy recommendations in the design and implementation of defense procurement.
|Title of host publication||Contributions to International Relations|
|Number of pages||22|
|State||Published - 2023|
|Name||Contributions to International Relations|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
The increased costs were compounded by additional changes. In 1982, the concept of the Lavi grew from the original close support mission to include air superiority (DeLoughry, 1990). The Israeli government authorized prototype construction for the updated Lavi with full-scale development starting in October of 1982. By 1987, requirements creep made the Lavi comparable to an F-16, but at an estimated cost 57% more than an F-16 (Haglund, 1989). In the face of increasing costs, the number of aircraft planned to be procured was reduced from 500 to 450 to 300 (Haglund, 1989; Van Creveld, 1998). Later, the Lavi program (jointly funded by the U.S. and Israeli governments) was cancelled in 1987 following a protracted debate between U.S. and Israeli officials, as well as internally, in Israel.
© 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
- Benefits and costs of oversight
- Defense procurement
- International relations
- Political oversight
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Sociology and Political Science
- Political Science and International Relations