Abstract
The hold-up problem is central to the theory of incomplete contracts. This can occur if, after making a sunk investment in a relationship, one party can be taken advantage of by the other party, leading to inefficient underinvestment. The authors describe a simple teaching experiment that illustrates the hold-up problem, and address how to integrate it into a class.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 377-385 |
Number of pages | 9 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Education |
Volume | 43 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Oct 2012 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- classroom experiments
- hold-up problem
- subgame perfection
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Education
- Economics and Econometrics