A signaling model of peaceful political change

Arieh Gavious, Shlomo Mizrahi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


The interaction between social activists and politicians is modeled by a signaling game in which activists send messages and politicians interpret them, attempting to understand the activists' goals. These goals range between extreme radical and very moderate changes that activists wish to achieve in policy or in the political system. The formal model shows the conditions for equilibrium with separating and pooling regions dependent on the type of social activists and the demands they raise. In the pooling region an activist who wants to achieve a certain degree of radical change sends a false signal, thus possibly leading politicians to enter negotiations under unfavorable conditions. This creates a momentum of peaceful political change.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)119-136
Number of pages18
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number1
StatePublished - Feb 2003
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics


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