A Panenmentalist Reconsideration of the Identity of Indiscernibles

If we consider any two entities (such as the two spheres in Max Black’s well-known thought-experiment) as individual possibilities, pure or actual, they cannot be considered indiscernible at all. Since allegedly indiscernible possibilities are necessarily one and the same possibility, any numerically distinct (at least two) possibilities must be discernible, independently of their properties, “monadic” or relational. Hence, any distinct possibility is also discernible. Metaphysically-ontologically, the identity of indiscernibles as possibilities is thus necessary, even though epistemic discernibility is still lacking or does not exist. Because any actuality is of an individual pure possibility, the identity also holds for actual indiscernibles. The metaphysical or ontological necessity of the identity of indiscernibles renders, I believe, any opposition to it entirely groundless.