A Panenmenalist Approach to Molyneux’s Problem and Some Empirical Findings

My panenmentalist approach to Molyneux’s problem rests upon the assumption that the newly-sighted person has an innate epistemic access to the individual pure possibilities of the actual sphere and cube, irrespective of any specific geometry and empirical data. If the new sight of such a person were normal, he or she could, immediately or after some training, distinguish between the sphere and the cube and relate them to his or her tactile previous acquaintance with these objects, while still being blind. This innate capability of cross-modal sensory identification is well understood in terms of my panenmentalist approach and some recent empirical tests as well. The example of synesthesia and that of “visual-to-auditory sensory substitute devices” (SSDs) demonstrate that our brain’s capability of cross-modal sensory identification is innate.