A new lower bound on the price of anarchy of selfish bin packing

György Dósa, Leah Epstein

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In standard bin packing, the goal is to partition or pack items with positive sizes of at most 1 into a minimum number of subsets, called bins, each of a total size no larger than 1. We study bin packing games. In these games, given a valid partition of the items, each item has a cost associated with it, based on the partition and on its size. Specifically, the cost of an item is the ratio between its size and the total size of items packed into its bin, that is, the cost sharing is in proportion to item sizes. We study pure Nash equilibria, which exist for all such games, and prove a new lower bound on the price of anarchy, which is the asymptotic worst-case ratio between the cost of the worst Nash equilibrium and a socially optimal packing.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)6-12
Number of pages7
JournalInformation Processing Letters
StatePublished - Oct 2019

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Elsevier B.V.


  • Bin packing
  • Combinatorial problems
  • Price of anarchy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Signal Processing
  • Information Systems
  • Computer Science Applications


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