A new derandomization of auctions

Oren Ben-Zwi; Ilan Newman; Guy Wolfovitz

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_21

A new derandomization of auctions

Oren Ben-Zwi, Ilan Newman, Guy Wolfovitz

Department of Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

Abstract

Let A be a randomized, unlimited supply, unit demand, single-item auction, which given a bid-vector b∈[h] ⁿ , has expected profit E[P(b)]. Aggarwal et al. showed that given A, there exists a deterministic auction which given a bid-vector b, guarantees a profit of E[P(b)]/4 - O(h). In this paper we show that given A, there exists a deterministic auction which given a bid-vector b of length n, guarantees a profit of E[P(b)]/4 - O(hn ln hn). As is the case with the construction of Aggarwal et al., our construction is not polynomial time computable.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Algorithmic Game Theory - Second International Symposium, SAGT 2009, Proceedings
Pages	233-237
Number of pages	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_21
State	Published - 2009
Event	2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2009 - Paphos, Cyprus Duration: 18 Oct 2009 → 20 Oct 2009

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	5814 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2009
Country/Territory	Cyprus
City	Paphos
Period	18/10/09 → 20/10/09

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Theoretical Computer Science
General Computer Science

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10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_21

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Ben-Zwi, O., Newman, I., & Wolfovitz, G. (2009). A new derandomization of auctions. In Algorithmic Game Theory - Second International Symposium, SAGT 2009, Proceedings (pp. 233-237). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 5814 LNCS). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_21

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title = "A new derandomization of auctions",

abstract = "Let A be a randomized, unlimited supply, unit demand, single-item auction, which given a bid-vector b∈[h] n , has expected profit E[P(b)]. Aggarwal et al. showed that given A, there exists a deterministic auction which given a bid-vector b, guarantees a profit of E[P(b)]/4 - O(h). In this paper we show that given A, there exists a deterministic auction which given a bid-vector b of length n, guarantees a profit of E[P(b)]/4 - O(hn ln hn). As is the case with the construction of Aggarwal et al., our construction is not polynomial time computable.",

author = "Oren Ben-Zwi and Ilan Newman and Guy Wolfovitz",

year = "2009",

doi = "10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_21",

language = "English",

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series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",

pages = "233--237",

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note = "2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2009 ; Conference date: 18-10-2009 Through 20-10-2009",

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Ben-Zwi, O, Newman, I & Wolfovitz, G 2009, A new derandomization of auctions. in Algorithmic Game Theory - Second International Symposium, SAGT 2009, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5814 LNCS, pp. 233-237, 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2009, Paphos, Cyprus, 18/10/09. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_21

A new derandomization of auctions. / Ben-Zwi, Oren; Newman, Ilan; Wolfovitz, Guy.
Algorithmic Game Theory - Second International Symposium, SAGT 2009, Proceedings. 2009. p. 233-237 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 5814 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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AB - Let A be a randomized, unlimited supply, unit demand, single-item auction, which given a bid-vector b∈[h] n , has expected profit E[P(b)]. Aggarwal et al. showed that given A, there exists a deterministic auction which given a bid-vector b, guarantees a profit of E[P(b)]/4 - O(h). In this paper we show that given A, there exists a deterministic auction which given a bid-vector b of length n, guarantees a profit of E[P(b)]/4 - O(hn ln hn). As is the case with the construction of Aggarwal et al., our construction is not polynomial time computable.

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A new derandomization of auctions

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