TY - GEN

T1 - A new derandomization of auctions

AU - Ben-Zwi, Oren

AU - Newman, Ilan

AU - Wolfovitz, Guy

PY - 2009

Y1 - 2009

N2 - Let A be a randomized, unlimited supply, unit demand, single-item auction, which given a bid-vector b∈[h] n , has expected profit E[P(b)]. Aggarwal et al. showed that given A, there exists a deterministic auction which given a bid-vector b, guarantees a profit of E[P(b)]/4 - O(h). In this paper we show that given A, there exists a deterministic auction which given a bid-vector b of length n, guarantees a profit of E[P(b)]/4 - O(hn ln hn). As is the case with the construction of Aggarwal et al., our construction is not polynomial time computable.

AB - Let A be a randomized, unlimited supply, unit demand, single-item auction, which given a bid-vector b∈[h] n , has expected profit E[P(b)]. Aggarwal et al. showed that given A, there exists a deterministic auction which given a bid-vector b, guarantees a profit of E[P(b)]/4 - O(h). In this paper we show that given A, there exists a deterministic auction which given a bid-vector b of length n, guarantees a profit of E[P(b)]/4 - O(hn ln hn). As is the case with the construction of Aggarwal et al., our construction is not polynomial time computable.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=71549162883&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_21

DO - 10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_21

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:71549162883

SN - 3642046444

SN - 9783642046445

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

SP - 233

EP - 237

BT - Algorithmic Game Theory - Second International Symposium, SAGT 2009, Proceedings

T2 - 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2009

Y2 - 18 October 2009 through 20 October 2009

ER -