A characterization of the asymmetric Nash solution

Shiran Rachmilevitch

doi:10.1007/s10058-015-0167-8

A characterization of the asymmetric Nash solution

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

The asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is characterized on the basis of independence of irrelevant alternatives, independence of equivalent utility representations, and a new axiom—moderate collective rationality. The latter is logically weaker than Roth’s (Math Oper Res 2:64–65, 1977) strong individual rationality and logically stronger than Anbarci and Sun’s (Soc Choice Welf 37:425–429, 2011) weakest collective rationality.

Original language	English
Article number	4
Pages (from-to)	167-171
Number of pages	5
Journal	Review of Economic Design
Volume	19
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-015-0167-8
State	Published - 23 Jun 2015

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

Keywords

Asymmetric Nash solution
Axioms
Bargaining

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Access to Document

10.1007/s10058-015-0167-8

Cite this

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A characterization of the asymmetric Nash solution

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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