A characterization of the asymmetric Nash solution

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The asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is characterized on the basis of independence of irrelevant alternatives, independence of equivalent utility representations, and a new axiom—moderate collective rationality. The latter is logically weaker than Roth’s (Math Oper Res 2:64–65, 1977) strong individual rationality and logically stronger than Anbarci and Sun’s (Soc Choice Welf 37:425–429, 2011) weakest collective rationality.

Original languageEnglish
Article number4
Pages (from-to)167-171
Number of pages5
JournalReview of Economic Design
Issue number2
StatePublished - 23 Jun 2015

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.


  • Asymmetric Nash solution
  • Axioms
  • Bargaining

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Economics, Econometrics and Finance


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