קרנות פנסיה מסוג ברירת מחדל: עיון בעיצוב מדיניות פנסיונית

The State of Israel underwent a significant process of reforming its occupational pension system, which was characterized by a deep regulatory intervention that included, among other things, a tender process in 2016 to select default occupational pension funds, while creating a competition for management fees. Despite the significant implications of the above reform, to date, the scope of writing or research on them has been limited.In light of the above, this study aimed to try and assess the manner and meaning of adopting a pension policy based on default pension funds, all from the perspective of key figures in the field. It should be noted however, that the study was based on data for the years 2017-2019, before Covid-19 and its implications, and before the investment houses “Hellman Aldubi” and “Psagot”were sold, which held the two least successful out of four default pension funds.The methodology used was a phenomenological qualitative one, in which the assessment of the above policy was made based on a content analysis of in-depth interviews conducted with 12 participants, all of whom are key figures in the world of pensions and insurance.The findings revealed three main themes: 1) The need for government-regulatory involvement in the pension market. 2) The degree of willingness of regulatory intervention in management fees through a default fund tender. 3)The long-term sustainability of default funds.The implications of these findings highlight the need for a comprehensive and open public discussion regarding the goals and purposes of the Social Security Arrangements for Aging in Israel, while involving all the relevant bodies involved.