פיקוח על מיזוגים כפתרון (חלקי) לבעיית הריכוזיות הכלל-משקית

The Israeli economy suffers from a high level of aggregate concentration, which occurs when a small group of economic entities controls a large part of the economic activity through holdings in many markets. Such concentration can create negative welfare effects on competition in the entire economy. In view of this,the aim of this article is to analyze how the various anti-competitive effects that stem from aggregate concentration can (potentially, and at least partially) be curtailed by the Israeli Competition Law. More specifically, the article shows that merger control is the best tool in the competition law toolbox for this task. This is because merger control enables the ex-ante prevention of some of the competitive threats that aggregate concentration might pose. The article contends that a wide-angle lens perspective should be adopted when scrutinizing mergers that might further increase aggregate concentration. That is – a perspective that takes into account the competitive effects of mergers on the entire Israeli economy, rather than on a single specific market. The article suggests guidelines that are premised on decision theory and are meant to minimize potential regulatory errors. Finally, the article shows how the proposed solution can be applied in tandem with other legal regimes that are meant to regulate aggregate concentration in Israel.